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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
(West Jordan City), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930728-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Bruce S. Robertson relies on his opening brief 
and replies to Appellee's brief as follows. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953); 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953); 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1987); 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1992); 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1953); 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1.7 (1992); 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1993); 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1991); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1308 (1991); 
Article VIII, § 16, Constitution of Utah. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A review of statutes involving prosecutions by cities 
demonstrates that cities have not historically had the authority to 
select any state misdemeanor and prosecute it in the name of the 
State. Instead, city prosecutors had the authority to prosecute 
city ordinances. City prosecutors had statutory authorization to 
prosecute state code violations in only two narrow, specifically 
delineated areas prior to the adoption of Article VIII, section 16 
and have not historically had the ability to select any state 
misdemeanor for prosecution, as was done in this case. 
In addition, the clear constitutional mandate overrides any 
legislative action. In other words, even if the statute authorizes 
a city prosecutor to charge state crimes, the constitutional mandate 
precludes the primary exercise of such authority. 
The city prosecutor exercised primary authority in this 
case and under the scheme outlined by West Jordan City ("City11). 
According to the City's argument, city prosecutors get first crack 
at state misdemeanors and infractions. The exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion includes a decision not to prosecute as 
well as a decision to file certain charges. A decision by an 
elected prosecutor not to file state charges can be overridden by a 
city prosecutor under the City's scheme. The broad discretion given 
prosecutors and the potential for abuse requires that the mandate of 
Article VIII, section 16 be followed, and an elected public 
prosecutor be given primary authority for the prosecution of state 
misdemeanors and infractions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. PROSECUTION OF STATE MISDEMEANOR CHARGES 
BY AN UNELECTED CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATES 
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 16 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Although "statutes are presumed to be constitutional" 
(Salt Lake City v. Ohms, Case No. 930580 (Utah August 18, 1994), 
amended slip op. at 4, quoting State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990)), "when a proper challenge to the 
constitutionality of a given statute is made, the said statute must 
be examined to determine if it is unconstitutional, either on its 
face or as applied. [citations omitted]." Ohms, amended slip op. 
at 4. 
While the City is correct that the burden of showing the 
unconstitutionality of the statute is on Appellant, it is incorrect 
that Appellant must establish that the statute is "unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt." See City's brief at 5-6. Instead, the 
standard was clearly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) as 
follows: "The act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality. [citations omitted]." 
Article VIII, section 16 of the Utah Constitution controls 
"the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the 
State of Utah" (emphasis added). This constitutional provision does 
not refer to or affect the prosecution of criminal actions based on 
a violation of a city ordinance. Appellant's argument is that the 
instant prosecution which is brought by West Jordan City in the name 
of the State of Utah violates Article VIII, section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Article VIII, section 16 was enacted and approved by the 
voters in 1984 and became effective July 1, 1985. See Compiler's 
Notes following analysis at the beginning of Article VIII. Former 
Article VIII contained no similar provisions. See Compiler's Notes 
following Article VIII, section 16. 
The City claims that cities "have had the statutory 
authority to prosecute in the name of the State of Utah for nearly 
twenty years." City's brief at 7. A review of legislation enacted 
prior to the adoption of Article VIII, section 16 demonstrates that 
this claim is incorrect. 
In 1953, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-703 
and 10-3-928. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) authorized cities to 
pass municipal ordinances which are punishable as class B 
misdemeanors or lower.1 That statute remains in effect in its 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) provides: 
10-3-703. Penalty for violation of ordinance— 
Civil penalty for unauthorized use of property— 
Procedural rules. 
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by 
statute, the governing body of each municipality 
may provide a penalty for the violation of any 
municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the 
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 
76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six 
months, or by both the fine and term of 
imprisonment. The governing body may prescribe a 
minimum penalty for the violation of any 
municipal ordinance and may impose a civil 
penalty for the unauthorized use of municipal 
property, including, but not limited to, the use 
of parks, streets, and other public grounds or 
equipment. Rules of civil procedure shall be 
substantially followed. 
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original version without any amendments. 
The original version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 gave city 
attorneys the authority to prosecute violations of city ordinances. 
The original version of Section 10-3-928 remained in effect until 
1987, three years after Article VIII, section 16 was passed. It 
stated: 
10-3-928. Attorney 
The city attorney shall have the duty to 
prosecute violations of city ordinances and shall 
have the same powers in respect to violations of 
city ordinances as may be exercised by a county 
attorney in respect to violations of state law, 
including, but not limited to, granting immunity 
to witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
These two statutes demonstrate that at the time 
Article VIII, section 16 was adopted, city attorneys with rare 
exception prosecuted violations of city ordinances. These 
violations of city ordinances were punishable by fines and sentences 
not to exceed that for class B misdemeanors. 
Prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision, the 
legislature gave the city the ability to prosecute violations of the 
state code in only two specifically delineated areas. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215, enacted in 1977, cities had legislative 
authority to prosecute pornography-related crimes outlined in 
part 10 of Title 76.2 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 
2. Allowing city attorneys to prosecute pornography-related crimes 
may have been inspired by the requirement that the material offend 
"contemporary community standards" and the 1977 Utah Supreme Court 
decision holding that contemporary community standards are local 
standards and do "not require the application of a statewide 
standard." State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112, 1113 
(Utah 1977), interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (1953). 
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(1983), enacted in 1983, city prosecutors had the authority to 
prosecute certain state class B misdemeanor charges of driving on 
suspension. See Addendum A for text of former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.8 (1983) and former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977).3 
These are the only two areas where city prosecutors were allowed to 
prosecute state crimes prior to the adoption of Article VIII, 
section 16. 
While city attorneys had been prosecuting pornographic 
crimes for approximately seven years when the constitutional 
provision was adopted, they had only been authorized to prosecute 
state driving on suspension charges under the code for about one 
year.4 Hence, a review of legislation in place at the time 
Article VIII, section 16 was adopted demonstrates that cities were 
not permitted to select any misdemeanor under the state code and 
prosecute it. Instead, city prosecutors were authorized to 
prosecute violations of city ordinances and two specifically 
delineated types of crime under the state code. 
Following the adoption of Article VIII, section 16, the 
legislature enacted two provisions which permitted city attorneys to 
prosecute certain state class A misdemeanor charges. Such 
legislation included the amendment to Section 41-6-44.8 which allows 
3. The legislature has revised this statute to include the role of 
a district attorney. 
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953), cities were able 
to pass city ordinances making driving on suspension as outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983) a crime. Granting city attorneys 
the authority to prosecute these driving on suspension charges in 
the name of the State was unnecessary. 
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a city to prosecute driving on revocation and driving under the 
influence as class A misdemeanors where the defendant has been 
convicted of a prior DUI or license charge. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1308, enacted in 1991, authorizes city prosecutors to 
prosecute subsequent solicitation charges as class A misdemeanors 
where the defendant has a prior similar conviction.5 
These post-1984 statutes also demonstrate that city 
prosecutors have not traditionally had the ability to prosecute any 
state misdemeanor. Instead, the authorization to prosecute state 
misdemeanors has been limited to specific crimes which are similar 
to or based on enhancements from the types of crimes the cities 
prosecute under city ordinances. 
Finally, a review of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 demonstrates 
that city attorneys have not historically had the ability to select 
any state misdemeanor and prosecute it. The version of Section 
17-18-1 in effect when Article VIII, section 16 was adopted stated: 
17-18-1. Powers—Duties—Prohibitions. 
The county attorney is a public prosecutor, 
and must: 
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within his county, except for misdemeanor 
prosecutions under city or town ordinances 
and appeals therefrom. 
This statute demonstrates that at the time Article VIII, 
section 16 was adopted, county attorneys were responsible for 
5. The constitutionality of these other statutes authorizing the 
city to prosecute in certain delineated areas is not before this 
Court in this case. It should be noted that the existence of these 
other statutes does not add weight to the City's argument in this 
case. The legislature may well have passed additional 
unconstitutional statutes. 
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prosecuting all crimes except for misdemeanors based on violations 
of city ordinances. 
The above language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 remained in 
effect until 1992 when the legislature amended the statute to except 
prosecutions undertaken by city attorneys pursuant to Section 
10-3-928, the statute at issue in this case. That version of 
Section 17-18-1 reads: 
(1) The county attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals therefrom.6 
The 1992 amendment to Section 17-18-1 adds no support to 
the City's argument. It simply acknowledges the existence of 
6. The following legislation has since been enacted to take into 
account the creation of an office of district attorney. The current 
version reads as follows: 
17-18-1.7. Powers—Duties of district attorney— 
Prohibitions• 
(1) The district attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) prosecute in the name of the state 
all violations of criminal statutes of the 
state; 
(b) be a full-time county officer; 
(c) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them; and 
(d) institute proceedings before the 
proper magistrate for the arrest of persons 
charged with or reasonably suspected of any 
violation of state law when in possession of 
information that the offense has been 
committed, and for that purpose shall attend 
court in person or by deputy in cases of 
arrest when required. 
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Section 10-3-928 and the statutory authorization for such 
prosecutions. Prior to this amendment, the two statutes were 
inconsistent and raised a statutory as well as constitutional 
argument to prosecutions undertaken by a city attorney in the name 
of the State. 
Hence, a review of the statutory scheme both before and 
after the adoption of Article VIII, section 16 demonstrates that 
historically county attorneys have had the authority to prosecute 
state misdemeanors and city attorneys have not been free to charge 
state misdemeanors except in a few specifically delineated areas. 
Furthermore, even if the legislature had provided for such 
prosecution by city attorneys, such legislation would not be 
constitutional in the face of Article VIII, section 16. It is well 
established that the legislature cannot override constitutional 
mandates• 
A historical review of the language of Section 10-3-928 
also demonstrates that city attorneys did not have free rein to 
charge state misdemeanors at the time the constitutional provision 
was adopted. The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 which 
was in effect at the time of the adoption of Article VIII, 
section 16 gave city attorneys the power to prosecute violations of 
city ordinances. That statute did not allow city prosecutors to 
prosecute violations of the state code. See discussion supra at 6 
regarding the original version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953). 
In addition, the former version of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-928 which was adopted in 1987 required that city attorneys be 
- 9 -
sworn as "deputy public prosecutors" in order to prosecute class A 
misdemeanors in the name of the State. The former version of 
Section 10-3-928 stated: 
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public 
prosecutor. 
(1) The city attorney may prosecute 
violations of city ordinances and has the same 
powers in respect to violations of city 
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney 
in respect to violations of state law, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a 
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general, 
the county attorney of the county in which the 
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor 
having jurisdiction within the city limits. 
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be 
for a period of time as specified at the time of 
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and 
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the 
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the 
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated 
as such by the Legislature and committed within 
the territorial limits of the city. 
This requirement that city attorneys be sworn as deputy 
public prosecutors in order to prosecute state class A misdemeanors 
complied with the requirements of Article VIII, section 16 because 
the county attorney maintained primary authority over deputies. 
It was not until 1992 that the current version of Section 
10-3-928 went into effect. That version states: 
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public 
prosecutor. 
In cities with a city attorney, the city 
attorney may prosecute violations of city 
ordinances, and under state law, infractions and 
misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of 
the municipality and has the same powers in 
respect to the violations as are exercised by a 
county attorney or district attorney, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses. The city attorney shall represent the 
- 10 -
interests of the state or the municipality in the 
appeal of any matter prosecuted in any trial 
court by the city attorney. 
The wide range of discretion to prosecute state 
misdemeanors which the City claims is authorized by this provision 
is unprecedented. Prior to this amendment of Section 10-3-928, no 
statute even remotely suggested that city attorneys had the 
authority to prosecute any state misdemeanor it selected. Instead, 
city attorneys were specifically authorized to prosecute only a few 
state crimes. The instant case appears to be the first case to be 
heard on appeal which challenges the prosecution by a city attorney 
of a state misdemeanor which is not explicitly authorized. 
It is not clear from the amended language of Section 
10-3-928 that the legislature intended to give city attorneys such 
wide discretion to prosecute state crimes. Instead, the amended 
language of that statute could be read to authorize prosecution of 
those state misdemeanors which are specifically delineated in other 
parts of the Code and not to confer additional authorization to 
prosecute.7 
The City claims that the word "primary" in Article VIII, 
section 16 implies that some entity has secondary authority to 
prosecute in the name of the State and that the City is one such 
entity. Even if the language were interpreted in this fashion, the 
7. While counsel for Appellant has been unable to find extensive 
legislative history relating to the recent change in Section 
10-3-298, it appears that the bill was tied into a concern regarding 
the distribution of surcharges on criminal cases. See H.B. 436, 
Gen. Sess. (1991) (comments by Senator Lyle W. Hillyard). 
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scheme which the City claims is authorized by the current version of 
Section 10-3-928 would give primary, not secondary authority to 
cities to prosecute state misdemeanors. In its brief, the City 
states: 
If at any time a city attorney fails to prosecute 
an individual for an alleged violation then the 
appropriate county or district attorney can 
prosecute the alleged violations. 
City's brief at 16. Under the City's interpretation, city 
prosecutors would be given first crack at state misdemeanor and 
infraction prosecutions. The elected public prosecutor would get 
involved only if the city prosecutor declined to prosecute. This 
approach is the opposite of that which is contemplated by 
Article VIII, section 16. That provision requires that the elected 
prosecutor have primary or chief responsibility and not that it get 
involved only where another prosecutor has declined to prosecute. 
Webster's Dictionary lists a number of definitions for the 
word "primary." These include: "first in time," that "from which 
others are derived," "fundamental," "first in importance," "first in 
order, quality and importance," or "direct." Webster's Dictionary, 
2d ed. 1129 (1972). None of these definitions comport with the 
scheme envisioned by the City whereby the City has first crack at 
the prosecution. 
In addition to disregarding the meaning of the term 
"primary," the City's scheme fails to recognize that a decision by a 
public prosecutor not to prosecute in the name of the State is as 
much a function of prosecutorial authority or discretion as is a 
- 12 -
decision to prosecute. In other words, where the public prosecutor 
declines prosecution by the state of a class A misdemeanor, a city 
prosecutor who does not have primary responsibility to prosecute in 
the name of the State cannot constitutionally override that 
decision. In this case, there is no record of whether the county 
attorney initially screened this case and declined to prosecute in 
the name of the State or whether the City simply decided to elevate 
the charges to a class A misdemeanor without ever presenting the 
case to the county attorney.8 
This transfer of authority to cities which the City claims 
is permissible under Article VIII, section 16 also transfers the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 
390, 402-404 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
broad discretion afforded prosecutors. This discretion includes a 
determination of "whether and in what manner to prosecute" and 
encompasses a determination as to "whether or not to prosecute, what 
charge should be made, and whether or not to dismiss, apply for 
immunity or plea to a lesser offense." Bell, 785 P.2d at 402, 404, 
quoting State v. Grayer, 215 N.W.2d 859, 860-1 (Neb. 1974). The 
prosecutor's exercise of discretion is "absolute in our system of 
criminal justice and "preserves the constitutional concept of 
separation of powers." Bell, 785 P.2d at 404. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that courts have 
8. The record does establish that the City initially charged 
Robertson in the justice court with some infractions. The City then 
dismissed the charges and refiled the case in circuit court. R. 170. 
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on occasion scrutinized the prosecutor's broad discretionary power 
and concluded "that the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile 
protection for the accused." State v. Brickey, 7i4 P.2d 644, 647 
(Utah 1986). Because the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
absolute and subject to abuse, the requirement of Article VIII, 
section 16 that public prosecutors be elected is especially 
important. An elected public prosecutor is accountable to the 
electorate while still having the autonomy to exercise his or her 
discretionary powers. By contrast, an unelected prosecutor is 
accountable only to his or her supervisors and not the electorate. 
Allowing city prosecutors to charge state crimes could detract 
significantly from the good faith exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and would grant powers to city attorneys which the Utah 
Constitution precludes. 
Finally, this prosecutorial responsibility mandated by 
Article VIII, section 16 cannot be delegated by the legislature to 
an unelected prosecutor. In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, No. 930580 
(Utah August 18, 1994) (amended slip op.) , the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the legislature cannot delegate "core judicial functions" 
to court commissioners and determined that "[p]ermitting the 
legislature to grant court commissioners authority to enter final 
judgment and impose sentence violates the separation of powers 
doctrine." Ohms, amended slip op. at 13.9 
9, In Ohms, the Court stated: 
Core functions or powers of the various branches 
of government are clearly nondelegable under the 
(continued) 
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A similar type of improper delegation occurred in this case 
if the legislature did in fact grant city prosecutors the power to 
prosecute state infractions and misdemeanors pursuant to Section 
10-3-928. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-928 (1992) is unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied to Appellant in that its fails to give primary 
responsibility for prosecution in the name of the State to an 
elected public prosecutor. Appellant/Defendant Bruce Robertson 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial judge's 
order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss and remand the case for 
entry of an order of dismissal. 
(footnote 9 continued) 
Utah Constitution. See# e.g., Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) 
(holding that legislative functions, such as 
powers of zoning and rezoning, cannot be 
delegated); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 
(Utah 1977) (holding that Utah Const, art. VI, 
§ 1 limits legislature's ability to delegate 
legislative powers or functions to others); In re 
Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d 116, 116 
(Utah 1970) (holding that Utah Supreme Court 
cannot delegate its duty to discipline an erring 
attorney to others); accord State v. Green, 793 
P.2d 912, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
"crime definition and penalty powers are 
essential legislative functions that cannot 
constitutionally be delegated by the Utah 
Legislature to any other person or body". 
Ohms, amended slip op. at 5-6. 
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ADDENDUM 
TEXTS OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) provides: 
10-3-703. Penalty for violation of ordinance— 
Civil penalty for unauthorized use of property— 
Procedural rules. 
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by 
statute, the governing body of each municipality 
may provide a penalty for the violation of any 
municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the 
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 
76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six 
months, or by both the fine and term of 
imprisonment. The governing body may prescribe a 
minimum penalty for the violation of any 
municipal ordinance and may impose a civil 
penalty for the unauthorized use of municipal 
property, including, but not limited to, the use 
of parks, streets, and other public grounds or 
equipment. Rules of civil procedure shall be 
substantially followed. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953) provided: 
10-3-928. Attorney 
The city attorney shall have the duty to 
prosecute violations of city ordinances and shall 
have the same powers in respect to violations of 
city ordinances as may be exercised by a county 
attorney in respect to violations of state law, 
including, but not limited to, granting immunity 
to witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1987) provided: 
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public 
prosecutor. 
(1) The city attorney may prosecute 
violations of city ordinances and has the same 
powers in respect to violations of city 
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney 
in respect to violations of state law, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a 
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general, 
the county attorney of the county in which the 
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor 
having jurisdiction within the city limits. 
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be 
for a period of time as specified at the time of 
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and 
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the 
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the 
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated 
as such by the Legislature and committed within 
the territorial limits of the city. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1992) provides: 
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public 
prosecutor. 
In cities with a city attorney, the city 
attorney may prosecute violations of city 
ordinances, and under state law, infractions and 
misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of 
the municipality and has the same powers in 
respect to the violations as are exercised by a 
county attorney or district attorney, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses. The city attorney shall represent the 
interests of the state or the municipality in the 
appeal of any matter prosecuted in any trial 
court by the city attorney. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1953) provided: 
17-18-1. Powers—Duties—Prohibitions. 
The county attorney is a public prosecutor, 
and must: 
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within his county, except for misdemeanor 
prosecutions under city or town ordinances 
and appeals therefrom. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1992) provides: 
17-18-1. Powers—Duties of county attorney— 
Prohibitions. 
(1) The county attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals therefrom. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 17-18-1.7 (1992) provides: 
17-18-1.7. Powers—Duties of district attorney— 
Prohibitions. 
(1) The district attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) prosecute in the name of the state 
all violations of criminal statutes of the 
state; 
(b) be a full-time county officer; 
(c) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them; and 
(d) institute proceedings before the 
proper magistrate for the arrest of persons 
charged with or reasonably suspected of any 
violation of state law when in possession of 
information that the offense has been 
committed, and for that purpose shall attend 
court in person or by deputy in cases of 
arrest when required. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983) provided: 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to 
prosecute for driving while license suspended or 
revoked. 
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which 
consist of the person driving while his 
operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or 
revoked for a violation of section 41-6-44, a 
local ordinance which complies with the 
requirements of section 41-6-43, section 
41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a criminal 
prohibition that the person was charged with 
violating as a result of a plea bargain after 
having been originally charged with violating one 
of more of those sections or ordinances, may be 
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as 
well as by prosecutors who are empowered 
elsewhere in this code to prosecute those alleged 
violations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1993) provides: 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified 
offenses may prosecute for certain DUI offenses 
and driving while license suspended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be 
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as 
well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in 
this code to prosecute these alleged violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor 
violations of Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii); 
and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 
53-3-227, which consist of the person 
operating a vehicle while his operator's 
license is suspended or revoked for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, a local 
ordinance which complies with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 
41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal 
prohibition that the person was charged with 
violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with 
violating one or more of those sections or 
ordinances. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977) provided: 
76-10-1215. Prosecution by county or city 
attorney—Fines payable to county or city. 
Prosecution for violation of any section of this 
part, including a felony violation, shall be 
brought by the county attorney of the county 
where the violation occurs. If the violation 
occurs, however, in a city of the first or second 
class, prosecution may be brought by either the 
county or city attorney, notwithstanding any 
provision of law limiting the powers of city 
attorneys. All fines imposed for the violation 
of this part shall be paid to the county or city 
of the prosecuting attorney, as the case may be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1992) provides: 
76-10-1302. Prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when: 
(a) he engages in any sexual activity 
with another person for a fee; 
(b) is an inmate of a house of 
prost itut i on; or 
(c) loiters in or within view of any 
public place for the purpose of being hired 
to engage in sexual activity. 
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. 
However, any person who is convicted a second 
time, and on all subsequent convictions, under 
this section or under a local ordinance adopted 
in compliance with Section 76-10-1307 is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, except as provided in 
Section 76-10-1309. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1991) provides: 
76-10-1304. Aiding prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of aiding 
prostitution if he: 
(a) solicits a person to patronize a 
prostitute; 
(b) procures or attempts to procure a 
prostitute for a patron; 
(c) leases or otherwise permits a place 
controlled by the actor, alone or in 
association with another, to be used for 
prostitution or the promotion of 
prostitution; or 
(d) solicits, receives, or agrees to 
receive any benefit for doing any of the 
acts prohibited by this subsection. 
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B 
misdemeanor. However, a person who is convicted 
a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, 
under this section or under a local ordinance 
adopted in compliance with Section 76-10-1307 is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1308 (1991) provides: 
76-10-1308. Prosecution. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be 
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as 
well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in 
this code to prosecute these alleged violations: 
(1) class A misdemeanor violations of 
Section 76-10-1302; and 
(2) class A misdemeanor violations of 
Section 76-10-1304. 
Article VIII, § 16 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec.16. [Public prosecutors.] 
The Legislature shall provide for a system 
of public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah 
and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be 
elected in a manner provided by statute, and 
shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a 
public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, 
the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a 
prosecutor pro tempore. 
